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Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability 
1.  Introduction 
  This paper examines whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) leads to capital market benefits through enhanced comparability.  That is, we 
investigate whether IFRS adoption alters the information environment even within countries that 
ex ante have domestic standards similar to IFRS.  While prior research documents that adoption 
of international accounting standards is associated with higher quality accounting (e.g., 
Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 2008), much of this improvement appears to occur for 
firms domiciled in countries having domestic standards that differ significantly from 
international standards.  This limits prior literature’s ability to disentangle whether IFRS-related 
improvements in information quality result from changes in the precision of information specific 
to the firm (i.e., core information quality) versus changes in the precision of across-firm 
reporting signals (i.e., comparability).
1  We extend this literature by documenting that adoption 
of IFRS leads to capital market benefits even in a setting having few ex ante differences between 
domestic standards and IFRS.  That is, we provide evidence consistent with mandatory IFRS 
adoption leading to capital market benefits through improved comparability.   
To isolate the effects attributable to changes in comparability, we examine firms 
domiciled in the UK over 2003 through 2006.  Several institutional features make this a unique 
setting to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on comparability.  First, the capital markets in 
which the UK competes absorbed an exogenous reporting shift with the mandatory adoption of 
                                                 
1   Throughout the paper, we use the term “information environment” to represent any reporting signal that is useful 
to market participants in assessing firm performance.  Verrecchia (1990) notes that “information quality” 
involves the distributional characteristics of an uncertain event (e.g., its variance).  We focus on two separate 
sources of information quality: “core information quality,” defined as reporting signals specific to the firm that 
are sourced internally (e.g., the firm i’s earnings announcements) or externally (e.g., analyst earnings forecasts 
for firm i); and “comparability,” defined as the degree of precision in across-firm reporting signals (e.g., firm i’s 
and firm j’s earnings). 3 
 
IFRS within the European Union (EU) effective for fiscal years beginning January 1, 2005.  
Second, the domestic accounting standards of the UK are arguably quite similar to IFRS (e.g., 
Bae et al. 2008), suggesting that information quality benefits from IFRS adoption are less likely 
attributable to changes in core information quality.  Finally, the UK equity market is deeper 
relative to other markets experiencing IFRS adoption, providing both more precision in 
measuring our primary proxies as well as increased statistical power.  
We use as our dependent variable the change in abnormal returns following insiders’ 
equity market purchases of their own firms’ shares, which captures private information 
possessed by firm insiders.
2  Because UK domestic standards are similar to IFRS, we assume 
that any change in private information benefits for insiders of these firms is driven primarily by 
changes in financial statement comparability (i.e., across-firm reporting signals).  That is, we 
expect that mandatory IFRS adoption will improve the public information set (and by extension, 
reduce the private information set) by allowing all users to better infer firm performance and 
valuation through enhanced comparability of financial statements across a larger and trans-
national set of firms that report within the same accounting standards. 
Empirical results are consistent with IFRS adoption leading to capital market benefits 
associated with improvements in comparability.  After controlling for other determinants of 
returns to insider purchases, we find that insider purchases of UK firms’ shares exhibit 
statistically and economically lower abnormal returns subsequent to IFRS adoption, relative to 
those prior to adoption.  These results are robust to multiple return measurement windows (i.e., 
five-day, one-month, three-month, and six-month), and alternative definitions of abnormal 
returns (e.g., using alternative risk adjustments).   
                                                 
2   Insiders’ purchases tend to be more informative than insiders’ sales (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng, 
Metrick, and Zeckhauser, 2003) in part because of asymmetric litigation risk (e.g., Skinner, 1994). 4 
 
To further validate that these effects are most likely attributable to changes in 
comparability versus changes in core information quality, we perform two additional sets of 
analyses.  First, we examine whether our effects are consistent for firms experiencing the greatest 
increases in comparability using three alternative measures based on: DeFond et al. (2011); 
DeFranco et al. (2011); and intra-industry information transfers adapted from Yip and Young 
(2012) and Wang (2011).  Results confirm that firms experiencing the greatest increases in 
comparability exhibit greater reductions in abnormal returns to insider purchases following IFRS 
adoption relative to those experiencing smaller increases in comparability.  Second, we control 
for variation in core information quality that can remain even within our UK sample, and thus 
potentially confound our inferences with respect to comparability.  Specifically, we assess the 
impact of IFRS within sub-samples of UK firms that are likely to have the highest levels of core 
information quality before IFRS: those with low changes in accruals, low reconciling items 
between UK standards and IFRS, low closely held shares, or high analyst following.  We find 
that IFRS adoption reduces the abnormal returns to insider purchases for firms within each of 
these subsamples.  If these firms are the least likely to exhibit IFRS-related improvements in core 
information quality, then this evidence is consistent with IFRS affecting a change in firms’ 
information environments relating to comparability. 
Overall, the results are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption leading to capital 
market benefits of reduced returns to insider trades due to improved comparability.  These 
findings contribute to prior literature that investigates anticipated (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010) 
and actual (e.g., Daske et al. 2008) effects of IFRS adoption by documenting that IFRS adoption 
also leads to capital market benefits through enhanced comparability, consistent with a primary 
regulatory motivation (see Regulation EC No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament).  In 5 
 
addition, we complement recent studies examining comparability in the context of mandatory 
IFRS adoption (DeFond et al. 2011; Yip and Young 2012) by documenting that the benefits to 
IFRS adoption can accrue even to firms having domestic standards similar to IFRS, where core 
information quality is less likely to have changed.  We also provide further evidence on the 
association between insider trading profits and properties of financial reporting (e.g., Beneish 
and Vargus 2002). 
Section 2 discusses the prior literature and hypothesis development.  Section 3 presents 
the research design.  Section 4 presents the sample selection, descriptive data, and empirical 
results.  Section 5 presents analyses of alternative measures of comparability and firms 
partitions.  Section 6 presents sensitivity analyses.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Hypothesis Development and Background 
Hypothesis development 
  The widespread adoption of IFRS and its related convergence initiatives have led to 
numerous studies examining its implications.  Prior literature documents that investors positively 
anticipated IFRS adoption in Europe (Armstrong et al. 2010).  Prior papers further document a 
general reduction in information asymmetry for firms voluntarily adopting IFRS with 
corresponding commitment to high quality implementation (Daske et al. 2009), as well as for 
firms adopting IFRS by mandate within settings of high enforcement regimes (e.g., Daske et al. 
2008; Li 2010).  This prior research indicates that IFRS adoption, when coupled with 
enforcement or commitment, leads to changes in the information for the markets in which these 
firms operate.  It further suggests that these changes may derive from improvements in core 6 
 
information quality, since there is a large effect where pre-IFRS domestic standards differ 
substantially from IFRS (e.g., Daske et al. 2008).   
Prior research also examines the IFRS adoption effect, if any, upon changes attributable 
to improvements in financial reporting comparability.  Comparability is typically defined as the 
quality of information enabling users to identify similarities in and differences between two sets 
of economic phenomena (FASB 2008).  Horton et al. (2012) provides evidence that analyst 
forecast accuracy improves after mandatory IFRS adoption for analysts covering firms that 
report under multiple standards before IFRS adoption.  Similarly, Tan et al. (2011) documents 
that analyst coverage is increasing in the extent to which IFRS adoption eliminates differences in 
standards between the firm’s country and that of the analyst.  Relatedly, DeFond et al. (2011) 
finds evidence of increased foreign mutual fund ownership flows following mandatory IFRS 
adoption for firms domiciled in countries with both increases in uniformity and greater 
enforcement, inferring that IFRS adoption leads to improved comparability.
3          
  We extend this literature by examining whether informational benefits accrue to firms 
domiciled in a country (the UK) that exhibits few ex ante differences between domestic GAAP 
and IFRS.  In this setting, it is less likely that IFRS adoption would provide benefits relating to 
core information quality (i.e., changing the distributional properties of reporting signals specific 
to the firm) for firms domiciled within this country, because the nature of this information should 
not change substantially before versus after IFRS adoption.  However, benefits may accrue due 
to improvements in comparability (i.e., more precision from across-firm reporting signals) that 
arise from changes in core information quality for non-UK firms.  Specifically, IFRS adoption 
can reduce the ability to exploit private information for firms already reporting under high 
                                                 
3   More recent work by Barth et al. (2011) documents that adoption of IFRS by non-US firms leads to financial 
reporting information that is more comparable with that of US firms. 7 
 
quality pre-IFRS standards, if the information environment for other (competitor) firms improves 
upon IFRS adoption.  In other words, the relative level of information (i.e., that relating to the 
covariance between a firm’s and all other firms’ future cash flows) may change, if the 
information for peer firms changes upon IFRS adoption, which can likely occur for competitor 
firms in countries with domestic standards that differ significantly from IFRS.  
Accordingly, if IFRS adoption improves comparability, then we predict that the 
informativeness of insider trades will decrease following IFRS adoption even in a setting in 
which the precision of core information for these firms is not substantially changing per se.  
Insiders’ information advantage derives from access to firm-specific information about decisions 
that may affect firm performance, and from a sophisticated understanding of how firm 
performance is correlated with (and is potentially affected by) the performance of other firms 
(e.g., Wu and Zhang 2010).  Thus, comparability improvements should improve investors’ 
ability to understand a firm’s relative performance and concurrently diminish insiders’ 
informational advantage, after more firms provide financial information under a common 
reporting system.  Therefore, we expect that comparability improvements will reduce some (but 
not likely all) of insiders’ information advantage.
4   
 
UK setting and insider trading 
To examine whether IFRS adoption leads to comparability improvements, we choose 
firms domiciled in the UK for several reasons.  First, the capital markets in which the UK 
operates absorbed an exogenous reporting shift with mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU 
effective 2005.  Prior literature reveals that while the associated reconciliations from UK 
                                                 
4   Consistent with a partial reduction in insiders’ information advantage, untabulated descriptive evidence reveals 
that insider purchasing activity is not significantly reduced pre- versus post IFRS (although the returns to such 
trades are significantly reduced).   8 
 
standards to IFRS exhibit some information content, these reactions vary across UK firms (e.g., 
Christensen et al. 2007; Christensen et al. 2009; Horton and Serafeim 2010).  Second, prior 
research suggests that domestic accounting standards in the UK are similar to IFRS.  In 
particular, Bae et al. (2008) systematically review the accounting standards comprising IFRS, 
and conclude that these standards do not differ substantially from those in the UK (see their 
Table 1).  Thus, while some differences may exist between UK standards and IFRS, UK 
standards appear the closest to IFRS relative to other countries adopting IFRS.  Third, restricting 
the analysis to a single country mitigates variation in institutional characteristics that can 
confound inferences drawn from other studies that rely on cross-country samples.  Finally, the 
UK requires timely disclosures regarding the timing and amounts of equity traded by insiders, 
which is our primary proxy for possession of private information.  The insider trade reporting 
requirements are less strict in other EU countries, particularly prior to IFRS adoption.  
Accordingly, the UK setting appears unique in offering a developed capital market with domestic 
standards similar to IFRS, which improves our ability to isolate effects of IFRS adoption that are 
most likely attributable to comparability.
5, 
6    
                                                 
5   Recent research (Fidrmuc et al. 2011) finds that insider purchases are more informative in countries with 
stronger governance and enforcement institutions, consistent with our use of the UK as a setting.  While we note 
that this can bias against our findings (to the extent that potential improvements to reporting, such as IFRS 
adoption, lead to increased returns to insider trades), this effect is unclear, as enforcement quality typically 
affects the informativeness of insider sales (versus purchases).  Further, other countries with smaller capital 
markets but domestic standards similar to IFRS and strong enforcement (e.g., Singapore and Ireland) may exhibit 
stronger benefits from increased comparability relative to the UK.  Thus, as an already highly developed capital 
market, the UK provides a possible lower bound on the economic benefits of improved comparability. 
6   Consistent with foreign peer firms being used to evaluate UK firms, we find among our sample firm-years 
having analyst coverage in IBES that 50% are covered by at least one analyst covering at least one (European) 
foreign peer.  Further, recent research provides evidence of an increase in relative performance evaluation using 
foreign peers around mandatory IFRS adoption in Europe (e.g., Wu and Zhang 2011; Ozkan et al. 2012). 9 
 
Our primary proxy for private information is insiders’ trade returns to purchases of their 
own firm equity.
7  Empirical evidence regarding UK insider trading informativeness (e.g., 
Fidrmuc et al. 2006) and the regulatory framework surrounding insider trading in the UK suggest 
that returns to insider purchases provide a useful measure of information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders.  Assessing whether IFRS adoption affects the informativeness of insiders’ 
trades requires that insider trade laws remain constant across the IFRS-transition period.  Prior to 
IFRS adoption, insider trading in the UK was regulated by domestic rules (e.g., 1985 Companies 
Act).  In July 2005, the UK implemented EU directives (e.g., the Market Abuse Directive) that 
harmonized insider trading law across EU member states.  However, compliance with these EU 
directives did not change the UK insider trading enforcement environment, because the UK 
retained its stricter domestic provisions.  Thus, the UK regulatory framework surrounding insider 
trading remained constant during the IFRS transition period. 
The UK relies on a similar notion of illegal insider trading to that of the US (Engle 2010).  
Specifically, inside information is defined as  
information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or 
indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial 
instruments and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect 
on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial 
instruments. (Market Abuse Directive 2006/6/EC)   
EU regulation fundamentally considers insider trading to be an abuse of the market rather than a 
breach of fiduciary duty to the company.  Insiders are defined as any person who “by virtue of 
                                                 
7   We define insiders as executive and non-executive members of the board of directors (see complete definition in 
the Glossary of the FSA’s Handbook: http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/glossary-html/handbook/Glossary/ 
D?definition=G296). 10 
 
his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer […] 
possesses inside information”; thus, both corporate directors and officers are considered insiders.  
Disclosure rules regarding equity transactions executed by insiders require that these 
trades be revealed within five days of execution, as per the UK Model Code and the EU Market 
Abuse Directive prior to and after 2005, respectively.  These requirements remain constant both 
under UK domestic insider trading regulation, as well as rules applicable under the more recent 
EU directives.  Consistent with this requirement for timely disclosure, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 
reports that 85% of the observations in their sample of UK directors’ and officers’ transactions 
between 1991 and 1998 are reported within a day of their execution.       
Finally, regulation over insider trading in the UK is enforced by the Financial Services 
Authority, which can impose civil sanctions on persons engaging in insider trading.  The extent 
to which corporate directors and officers can engage in illegal trading in the UK appears to be 
limited.  For instance, UK insiders are precluded from trading during the two months prior to 
earnings announcements (Pope et al. 1990), and that rule appears to be strictly enforced, as 
insider trading is virtually non-existent during that window (Hillier and Marshall 1998, 2002).   
 
3.  Research Design 
We choose to examine insider purchases of shares to directly examine a users’ ability to 
exploit private information (Kyle 1985).  The focus on purchases better isolates informative 
trading relative to sales.  Prior research (both in the US and UK) documents that insiders’ 
purchase transactions have a stronger association with subsequent stock returns than insiders’ 
sales transactions (Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Fidrmuc et al. 2006).  This empirical regularity is 
commonly attributed to an asymmetry in litigation risk associated with trading on privately 11 
 
known bad news versus good news and a greater proportion of sales being driven by liquidity or 
portfolio rebalancing needs.
8 
To assess the informativeness of insider purchases surrounding IFRS adoption, we 
estimate the following regression: 
BHRETjt = α0 + α1BUYSIZEjt + α2BMjt + α3SIZEjt + α4RDjt + α5CLOSEHELDjt + α6RETLAGjt + 
α7VOLATILITYjt + α8IFRSjt + Industry f.e. + εjt (1) 
where: 
BHRET  is the cumulative abnormal buy-and-hold return for firm j (aggregated 
alternatively over one-month, three-month, or six-month windows), starting 
one day following insider purchases executed during fiscal year t minus the 
same window return to the Datastream Total UK Index;
9  
  BUYSIZE  is the total number of shares purchased by insiders of firm j during year t 
divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of year t; 
  BM is  firm  j’s book-to-market ratio, measured at the end of fiscal year t-1 
preceding the insider trades; 
  SIZE  is the log of firm j’s market capitalization (in $ thousands) at the end of fiscal 
year t-1 preceding the insider trades; 
  RD  is an indicator variable equaling 1 if firm j reports research and development 
expenses for fiscal year t-1 preceding the insider trades, and 0 otherwise; 
  CLOSEHELD  is the percentage of firm j’s common shares that are closely held at the end of 
year t-1 preceding the insider trades; 
                                                 
8   Untabulated results indicate that abnormal returns to insider sales are slightly negative prior to IFRS, and that 
these returns are not economically significant subsequent to IFRS adoption.  We do not draw inferences from 
insiders’ sales transactions because of confounding issues (e.g., litigation, liquidity trading) noted above. 
9   The Datastream Total UK Index captures 99.7% of UK market capitalization as of December 31, 2008.  12 
 
  RETLAG  is the market-adjusted cumulative return for firm j for year t-1 preceding the 
insider trades;  
  VOLATILITY  the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of firm j’s daily stock 
returns on the UK value-weighted market returns over year t-1 preceding the 
insider trades; and 
IFRS  an indicator variable equal to one for trades for firm j occurring under IFRS, 
and zero otherwise. 
  The dependent variable is BHRET, which is the market-adjusted return measured across 
one-month, three-month, and six-month windows, all beginning on the day following the insider 
purchase transaction.  We choose longer return windows to better capture private information 
likely having longer-term value implications, consistent with prior insider trading research (e.g., 
Seyhun 1998; Huddart and Ke 2007).  Finally, we aggregate all insider trades in a fiscal year, 
weighting the trades by the relative shares transacted, to derive a firm-level cumulative abnormal 
return to total insider trades.
10   
  Equation (1) includes control variables for previously documented determinants of 
profitability to insider trading.  BUYSIZE measures firm-level insider purchasing intensity during 
a fiscal year; the predicted coefficient is positive, as insiders are likely to maximize their trading 
profits by engaging in larger purchases when anticipating good news of a larger magnitude.  We 
include SIZE, predicting a negative coefficient as prior research documents that more profitable 
trades occur for smaller firms (Lakonishok and Lee 2001).  We include the book-to-market ratio 
(BM) and past returns (RETLAG); as insiders have been shown to exhibit contrarian trading 
behavior and also to purchase undervalued firm stock (Rozeff and Zaman 1998; Piotroski and 
                                                 
10  By aggregating trades to the firm level, we reduce the potential for over-fitting data due to multiple trades by 
insiders occurring during the year.   13 
 
Roulstone 2005), the predicted coefficient is positive for BM, and negative for RETLAG.  BM, 
SIZE, and RETLAG also control for risk factors not captured by the market-level adjustment of 
the dependent variable.
11   
We also control for accounting- and governance-based proxies for information 
asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders.  As insider purchases precede larger positive 
abnormal returns in firms with R&D activities (Aboody and Lev 2000), we predict a positive 
coefficient for RD.  As firms with a greater proportion of shares held by insiders are likely to 
have more opaque information environments, we predict a positive coefficient for CLOSEHELD.  
Finally, as insiders can better exploit their private information in stocks that exhibit greater 
volatility (Huddart and Ke 2007), we predict a positive coefficient for VOLATILITY.
12  
  Our variable of interest is IFRS, which we set equal to one for trades occurring during the 
IFRS reporting regime, and zero otherwise (i.e., if the firm reports under UK domestic 
standards).  Note that IFRS is not strictly a time-indicator variable: it varies on the firm’s 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, which can occur effective 2005 or 2006, depending on the firm’s 
fiscal year end (see related sensitivity analyses in Section 6).  If IFRS improves comparability of 
information across firms, both within the UK and across all other countries adopting IFRS, then 
we predict that BHRET will be negatively associated with IFRS.  That is, we expect that IFRS 
adoption will reduce insiders’ informational advantage by improving comparability, and thus 
reduce insiders’ ability to profit from their purchases. 
 
4.  Sample Selection, Descriptive Statistics, and Empirical Results 
                                                 
11  Equation (1) includes controls for risk such as book-to-market, size, and volatility.  We conduct untabulated 
sensitivity analyses estimating the dependent variable, BHRET, to control for market value of equity, book-to-
market, and industry.  Results are qualitatively similar. 
12  All tabulated results use continuous independent variables winsorized at one percent for each tail to mitigate the 
impact of outliers.  However, this choice has no effect on inferences relating to our experimental variable. 14 
 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics  
  Table 1 Panel A provides a description of our sample selection.  We begin with all firms 
listed on UK stock exchanges during 2003–2006.  We choose this sample period to allow for a 
balanced set of years before (2003 and 2004) versus after (2005 and 2006) mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  We end the sample period at 2006 to minimize the effects of the financial crisis 
(which could disproportionately affect our UK sample, owing to its substantial financial services 
industry) and associated stock market declines (which could directly affect our market-based 
measures―see Figure 1).
13  We obtain insider trading data from Directors Deals, a UK-based 
company that collects information across countries on disclosed equity transactions made by 
directors and officers in the shares of their own companies.  While coverage in most countries 
does not start until 2008 or later, the Director Deals database includes data on UK transactions 
since 1999.  The database includes transaction and reporting dates, insider name and position in 
the firm, type of transaction (purchase, sale, option exercise, etc.), shares traded and transaction 
price.  We eliminate firms that do not adopt IFRS by 2006,
14 that do not have any fiscal year 
with insider purchases (per Directors Deals database), that lack sufficient financial and market 
data for the analyses, and that do not have observations in both the pre- and post-IFRS periods.  
This leads to a final sample of 663 firms, with 2,616 firm-year observations.  We obtain financial 
data from Worldscope, market data from Datastream, and analyst data from IBES. 
Panel B compares our sample firms to the full population of UK firms.  The sample firms 
are larger and more profitable than the UK population, which is likely driven by the requirement 
                                                 
13  We note that Figure 1 reveals positive UK stock market performance throughout our 2003–2006 sample period.  
This should bias against finding reduced returns to insider purchases following mandatory IFRS adoption 
effective 2005.  In addition, untabulated descriptive statistics reveal that several risk measures (beta, return 
volatility, and synchronicity), calculated annually for our sample UK firms, do not appear to change over our 
sample period.  This suggests that changes in risk are not driving our findings. 
14  These latter firms primarily include those listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which tend to be 
smaller.  These firms were required to adopt IFRS effective 2007.  We analyze this subsample in Section 6.  15 
 
that larger firms adopt IFRS by 2006.  Panel C presents the industry composition based on the 
Fama-French 12-industry classification, with service industries (e.g., financial services, 
wholesale and retail) being the most represented.
15 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.  In Panel A, we present statistics at the insider 
trade level.  There are, on average, 1.667 (1.404) insiders purchasing (selling) stock per firm-
year in our sample.  In absolute value, the average amount purchased by insiders (£198,835) is 
significantly smaller than the average amount sold (£1,450,529).  The difference is less 
pronounced when transactions are scaled by shares outstanding (0.10% for purchases compared 
to 0.34% for sales), which suggests that purchases tend to occur in relatively smaller firms. In 
Panel B, we present statistics for the firm level observations used in the multivariate analyses.  
Consistent with prior research, insider purchases appear more informative than sales across all 
measurement windows.  For example, the mean three-month return following insider purchases 
is 3.00%, versus 0.00% for comparable insider sales.  Hence, the univariate statistics support our 
focus on insider purchases.     
 
Empirical results 
  Table 3 presents abnormal returns to insider purchases.  Panel A presents univariate 
results, comparing BHRET for purchases occurring in the pre- versus post-IFRS period.  Returns 
are reported over a one-month window in columns (1) and (2); three-month window in columns 
(3) and (4); and six-month window in columns (5) and (6).  Consistent with expectations, 
abnormal returns in the pre-IFRS period are higher relative to those in the post-IFRS period.  
Specifically, mean abnormal returns decrease after IFRS adoption from 2.08% to 0.68% for the 
                                                 
15  Results are robust to excluding financial services firms, which are subject to other regulatory provisions. 16 
 
one-month return window, 4.01% to 1.23% for the three-month window, and 6.75% to 2.09% for 
the six-month window.  These differences are all significant at the 1% level.
16 
  Panel B of Table 3 presents results from the multivariate analysis of BHRET.  Focusing 
on the one-month window, column (1) presents results including only the control variables.  As 
predicted, BHRET is increasing in the relative size of the purchase (coefficient for BUYSIZE = 
2.426, t-stat = 5.53) and in stock return volatility (coefficient for VOLATILITY = 0.723, t-stat = 
2.19).  BHRET is also decreasing in the size of the firm (coefficient for SIZE = –0.002, t-stat = –
1.80).  The remaining variables are insignificant.  Column (2) presents results regarding our 
variable of interest, IFRS.  Consistent with expectations, the coefficient is negative and 
significant (–0.012, t-stat = –4.64). 
  Results are similar using a three-month return window in columns (3) and (4), or a six-
month return window in columns (5) and (6).  The coefficients for the control variables are as 
predicted, including the coefficients for both book-to-market (BM) and lagged return (RETLAG).  
The coefficient for IFRS is also significantly negative in both the three-month window (–0.026, 
t-stat = –5.98) and the six-month window (–0.042, t-stat = –5.67) estimations.   
If the UK setting isolates firms for which comparability is the primary characteristic 
affected by mandatory IFRS adoption, the reduction in abnormal returns to insider purchases is 
consistent with improvements to financial statement comparability reducing insiders’ private 
information.
17   
 
                                                 
16  Median values are zero because there are a significant number of firm-years with no insider purchases, in spite of 
the sample selection criteria.  However, results are unchanged when excluding firm-years with no insider 
purchases, suggesting results are not driven by a reduction in insider purchasing around IFRS adoption. 
17  We further note that this reduction in insiders’ private information appears permanent in nature.  Specifically, 
various (untabulated) replications of the Table 3 analyses using a sample period extended to 2010 continue to 
document reduced abnormal returns to insider purchases post-IFRS adoption. 17 
 
5.  Alternative measures of comparability and firm partitions 
Alternative measures of comparability  
  We next examine whether our results correspond to recent research examining alternative 
measures of comparability.  We focus on three alternative measures based on DeFond et al. 
(2011), DeFranco et al. (2011), and on intra-industry information transfers.  
We first employ an industry-level measure of the change in financial statement 
comparability using a proxy developed by DeFond et al. (2011).  This proxy is a ratio, 
representing the increase in the pool of peer firms using the same set of standards, calculated for 
each 2-digit SIC industry group in our sample.  The numerator of this ratio for our study is the 
number of UK firms plus the number of firms in other European Union countries (which report 
under IFRS by 2005), while the denominator is the number of UK firms reporting under UK 
domestic standards in 2003 and 2004.  We designate firms as experiencing a low (high) increase 
in comparability if their industry is in the bottom (top) tercile of the percentage increase in 
comparable peers.  We expect a larger reduction in insiders’ information advantage for UK firms 
in industries with the largest increase in comparability. 
Our second proxy for financial statement comparability is based on DeFranco et al. 
(2011).  Consistent with Lang et al. (2010) and Yip and Young (2012), we estimate a cross-
country version of their accounting comparability measure and label it ACOMP.  Conceptually, 
ACOMP measures how closely similar economic events (stock returns) map into the financial 
statements (earnings) of two firms.  To implement this measure, we first estimate a firm-year 
specific earnings/returns association by running the following equation for each firm i over years 
t-3 to t, using all EU firms with available data from WorldScope and Datastream: 
NIit = β0i + β1iRETit + ρit (2) 18 
 
where NI is net income of firm i for fiscal year t scaled by beginning of the year market 
capitalization, and RET is the cumulative stock return for firm i over fiscal year t.  The estimated 
coefficients  0i and  1i from (2) constitute i’s accounting function.  Similarly, we estimate  0j 
and  1j for all firms j.  Finally, we compute firm i’s expected earnings using the accounting 
functions of firms i and j as follows: 
E(NI)iit =  0i +  1iRETit   (3) 
E(NI)ijt =  0j +  1jRETit   (4) 
That is, E(NI)iit and E(NI)ijt are the expected earnings of firm i for a given return RETit using firm 
i’s and firm j’s accounting function, respectively.  Accounting comparability between firms i and 
j in year t is then defined as follows: 
 (5) 
Consistent with Lang et al. (2010), we estimate ACOMPijt for all firm i-j pairs where i 
and j are in the same two-digit SIC industry group but in different countries.  The average 
ACOMPijt is then used as the firm-year specific accounting comparability ACOMPit.  A higher 
ACOMPit indicates that firm i exhibits higher accounting comparability with its foreign peers. 
We designate a firm as experiencing a low increase in comparability if its change from pre- to 
post-IFRS average ACOMPit is in the bottom tercile.  Similarly, we designate a firm as 
experiencing a high increase in comparability if its change from pre- to post-IFRS average 
ACOMPit is in the top tercile. 
Our third proxy for financial statement comparability is based on intra-industry 
information transfers around earnings announcements.  Concurrent work by Yip and Young 
(2012) and Wang (2011) suggests that IFRS enhances financial statement comparability in terms 
of transnational information transfer.  We construct an industry-level proxy for increased 19 
 
comparability around IFRS adoption in the EU using the following four steps.  First, for each 
earnings announcement date t of an EU firm i for fiscal years 2003 to 2006, we retrieve domestic 
market-adjusted returns for a three-day window around t for all EU firms in the same two-digit 
SIC group as i, provided they are not from the same country as i.  Second, we compute the 
absolute value of the equally-weighted average return across all foreign industry peers of i 
around i’s earnings announcement t and label it ABS_PEER_EARETit.  Third, we estimate the 
following regression separately for each two-digit SIC group with sufficient data available: 
   (6) 
The unit of observation is a firm-earnings announcement date, and ΔEPSit is firm i’s change in 
earnings per share from the previous fiscal year.  Fourth, we consider industries to have 
experienced improved financial statement comparability if (i) the estimation F-test is statistically 
significant and (ii) β1 is significantly positive (with a one-tailed p-value below 0.10). 
Results examining abnormal returns to insider purchases across sample partitions derived 
from these three comparability proxies are reported in Table 4.  Panel A presents descriptive 
statistics for the DeFond et al. (2011) and DeFranco et al. (2011) measures.  All differences 
across the low increase in comparability and high increase in comparability groupings are 
significant, suggesting significant variation in these variables.  Further, untabulated statistics 
reveal significantly larger values for the DeFond et al. and DeFranco et al. measures post-IFRS.
18  
Panel B presents the multivariate analyses.  We focus first on columns (1) and (2), which 
present returns to insider purchases over three-month return windows using the DeFond et al. 
(2011) proxy.  We find that the coefficient on IFRS for firms having a high increase in 
                                                 
18  The univariate statistics for the DeFranco et al. (2011) measure appear to suggest that comparability decreases 
(e.g., the mean value of –0.063 in Panel A) in the bottom tercile.  However, this measure likely contains noise in 
our setting: the Ret=f(E) function is estimated at the firm-level using rolling windows of four years, leading the 
post-IFRS measures to be estimated using a mix of pre- and post-IFRS observations.   20 
 
comparability is significantly negative (–0.032, t-stat = –4.10).  This coefficient is also 
marginally more negative than the coefficient on IFRS for firms having a low increase in 
comparability (F-test = 2.96, p-value < 0.10).  Columns (3) and (4) present results using the 
DeFranco et al. (2011) proxy.  Similar to the above, we find that the coefficient on IFRS for 
firms having a high increase in comparability is significantly negative (–0.045, t-stat = –5.08), 
and that this coefficient is more negative relative to firms that observe a low increase in 
comparability (F-test = 5.18, p-value < 0.05).  Columns (5) and (6) present results using the 
intra-industry information transfer proxy.  Again, we find that the coefficient on IFRS for firms 
having a high increase in comparability is significantly negative (–0.063, t-stat = –5.57), and 
more negative relative to firms with a low increase in comparability (F-test = 13.75, p-value < 
0.01).  Untabulated results using one- and six-month return windows are qualitatively similar.  
Overall, the table shows that the decrease in profitability of insider purchases is greater among 
firms having larger increases in financial statement comparability due to IFRS adoption.   
 
Firm partitions 
  We now examine several firm partitions to better identify subsamples of UK firms where 
we posit that IFRS adoption is less likely to affect core information quality.  This allows us to 
better isolate potential changes attributable to comparability (i.e., changes attributable to across-
firm information).  Accordingly, we partition firms into those having high versus low ex ante 
core information quality.  That is, even in a country setting such as the UK, in which firms’ 
financial reports have high average information quality, there is likely firm-level variation.  This 
variation can arise due to the nature of the firms’ operations (i.e., how well the accounting 
system captures the related economic phenomena), or due to the implementation of the reporting 21 
 
system by the firm.  Thus, we seek to identify sub-samples of UK firms likely to have high core 
information quality.  For this latter sample, we assume that observed changes in abnormal returns 
upon IFRS adoption are more likely attributable to changes in comparability versus changes in 
core information quality.
19 
  To proxy for ex ante core information quality, we employ four measures: change in 
accruals, reconciling items from UK standards to IFRS, closely held shares, and analyst 
following.
20  We choose these measures to capture, respectively, the internal reporting 
environment, the reporting transition to IFRS, the ownership/governance structure of the firm, 
and the external reporting environment.  We assume that insiders of firms having low change in 
accruals (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002), low levels of reconciling items, low levels of closely 
held shares, or high analyst following are likely to have fewer opportunities to trade on their 
private information.  Accordingly, we designate as ex ante high information quality those firms 
having: the lowest tercile of change in accruals; below median reconciling items; lowest tercile 
of closely held shares; or highest tercile of analyst following.  Conversely, we designate as ex 
ante low information quality those firms having: the highest tercile of change in accruals; above 
median reconciling items; highest tercile of closely held shares; or lowest tercile of analyst 
following.  We measure accruals as the absolute difference between cash flow from operations 
and net income, scaled by total assets.  We measure reconciling items using data from Horton 
and Serafeim (2010).
21  If core information quality is high for firms having low change in 
                                                 
19  We further partition our sample by isolating firms with both (i) a high increase in comparability and (ii) high 
core information quality prior to IFRS.  For example, we look at changes in insider purchase profitability for 
firms in the top tercile of change in comparability according to the DeFond et al. (2011) measure (i.e., high 
increase in comparability) and with high analyst following (i.e., ex ante high core information quality).  
Untabulated results continue to reveal significant decreases in abnormal returns for these subsamples of firms. 
20  Results are similar using size or market index membership.  We use analyst following, as prior research argues 
this is a stronger proxy for the external information environment (Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995). 
21  This data consists of the magnitude and major line items reported by UK firms in their required reconciliations 
from UK domestic GAAP to IFRS used to provide comparative amounts.  We designate firms as having low 22 
 
accruals, low reconciling items, low closely held shares, or high analyst following, we assume 
that any observed change in abnormal returns to insider purchases is more likely due to changes 
in comparability. 
  Table 5 presents results to these sample partitions.  Panel A presents descriptive statistics, 
revealing significant differences for all four proxies across subsamples designated as “low 
information quality” versus “high information quality,” as expected.  Panel B present the 
multivariate results.  Across all regressions, the dependent variable is BHRET, the abnormal buy-
and-hold return to insider purchases.  We present results measuring abnormal returns for the 
three-month window; (untabulated) inferences using one-month and six-month windows are 
similar.  Columns (1) and (2) present results using change in accruals; columns (3) and (4) use 
reconciling items; columns (5) and (6) use closely held shares; and columns (7) and (8) use 
analyst following.   
We first focus on column (1) for firms reporting high change in accruals (i.e., firms 
expected to have ex ante low information quality).  Among the control variables, abnormal 
returns to insider purchases are increasing in the size of the purchase (coefficient on BUYSIZE = 
4.328, t-stat = 3.08) and volatility (coefficient on VOLATILITY = 1.455, t-stat = 1.77), and 
decreasing in lagged returns (coefficient on RETLAG = –0.014, t-stat = –1.49).  The coefficient 
on IFRS is also significantly negative (–0.028, t-stat = –3.59); consistent either with benefits 
arising from improved comparability, or with improvements in core information quality (as this 
subsample of UK firms has ex ante low information quality).     
However, our primary interest lies in column (2), which presents results for firms 
reporting low change in accruals (i.e., firms expected to have ex ante high information quality).  
                                                                                                                                                             
(high) reconciling items if the absolute magnitude of their total balance sheet reconciliation scaled by market 
capitalization is below (above) our sample median.  We thank Horton and Serafeim for generously sharing their 
reconciliation data. 23 
 
Results among the control variables are similar.  Of note, the coefficient on IFRS remains 
significantly negative (–0.034, t-stat = –3.52).  This suggests that even for firms with very high 
information quality (i.e., those having low change in accruals), abnormal returns to insider 
purchases are reduced following mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Results across the remaining partitions are similar.  Columns (3) and (4) present results 
partitioning the sample using reconciling items; in column (4), for the subsample with low 
reconciling items (i.e., high information quality), the coefficient on IFRS is significantly negative 
(–0.041. t-stat = –4.92).  Columns (5) and (6) present results using closely held shares to 
partition the sample; in column (6), for firms with low closely held shares, the coefficient on 
IFRS is again negative (–0.014. t-stat = –1.87).  Finally, columns (7) and (8) present results 
partitioning firms using analyst following; in column (8), for firms with high analyst following, 
the coefficient on IFRS is negative and significant (–0.016. t-stat = –2.15).  If these proxies 
isolate UK firms unlikely to experience improvements in core information quality from IFRS 
adoption, the results remain consistent with improvements in financial statement comparability.   
 
6.  Sensitivity analyses 
  In this section, we assess the robustness of our results using several sensitivity analyses.  
First, we examine an alternative proxy for private information: analyst recommendation 
upgrades.  Second, we investigate alternative specifications to mitigate concerns that our findings 
are confounded by time-effects unrelated to IFRS adoption.  Next, we investigate an alternative 
measurement window: short-windows surrounding insider trades.  Finally, we explore an 
alternative sample: AIM firms.  
 24 
 
Alternative proxy for private information: analyst recommendation upgrades  
We now examine a second proxy to capture private information: abnormal returns to 
analyst recommendation upgrades.  Sell-side analysts act as information intermediaries, who 
aggregate and analyze firm, industry, and market-level data.  This analysis leads to investment 
recommendations that are disseminated to analysts’ clients.  Following prior research (e.g., 
Healy and Palepu 2001), we consider sell-side analysts to represent an alternative group of 
informed market participants; however, we expect this group to be a noisier proxy for private 
information relative to insider purchases, as analysts are unlikely privy to the level of private 
information insiders possess.  Similar to insiders, if IFRS improves comparability, this should 
reduce analysts’ private information benefits.  Thus, we predict that analysts’ information 
advantage will be reduced after IFRS adoption.
22  
We re-estimate Equation (1), replacing the dependent variable of BHRET with 
BHRET_ARU, the buy-and-hold return to analyst recommendation upgrades (i.e., “upgrades”).  
To identify upgrades, we compare a given analyst recommendation to the previous one issued by 
the same analyst for the same firm.  We define as upgrades those recommendations that either: 
(i) are both more favorable than the previous issued recommendation, and have at least a “Hold” 
recommendation; or (ii) are first-time recommendations that are designated as a “Buy” or 
“Strong Buy.”  BHRET_ARU is calculated similar to BHRET.
23 
                                                 
22  We note three issues surrounding the use of analysts to proxy for users having private information.  First, both 
UK and EU regulations preclude selective disclosure of material information by companies to analysts.  Second, 
consistent with our use of returns to insider purchases to proxy for private information benefits, we investigate 
changes in the profitability of analyst recommendation upgrades.  However, it is unclear ex ante whether 
favorable analyst recommendations are more likely driven by “inside” information than unfavorable 
recommendations (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Mayew 2008).  Finally, we note that improved 
comparability may allow analysts to provide more informative recommendations, biasing against reduced returns 
to analyst recommendation upgrades following IFRS adoption.    
23  Specifically, we calculate the return measured across one-month, three-month, and six-month windows, for each 
analyst upgrade, beginning on the day following the upgrade.  For each return, we then subtract the stock market 
return for the Datastream Total UK Index, calculated over the same window to arrive at an upgrade-specific 25 
 
We include all the equation (1) independent variables in our analysis of recommendation 
upgrades (except for BUYSIZE) with the same predicted signs.  The inclusion of these variables 
is motivated by analysts being informed agents whose recommendation upgrades are more likely 
to be profitable in stocks (i) that are undervalued and (ii) whose information environment is less 
transparent.  Our variable of interest remains IFRS, as previously defined.  We predict a negative 
coefficient if IFRS adoption reduces analysts’ informational advantage by improving 
comparability.   
Untabulated univariate results reveal reduced abnormal returns to analyst 
recommendation upgrades of 1.28% to 0.60% in the one-month return window, 2.94% to 0.83% 
in the three-month window, and 5.33% to 1.50% in the six-month window (all significant at the 
5% level).  Table 6 presents the multivariate results.  Focusing on the three-month window in 
column (2), the coefficient on IFRS is significantly negative (–0.020, t-stat = –3.48), as 
predicted.  Results are similar using a one-month window in column (1), and six-month window 
in column (3).  Columns (4) and (5) then present results using the DeFond et al. (2011) 
comparability measure.  While we observe reduced returns to analyst recommendation upgrades 
for firms exhibiting high increases in comparability (coefficient on IFRS = –0.025, t-stat = –
2.68), we fail to find that this difference is more negative relative to firms exhibiting low 
increases in comparability (F-test = 1.02).  Similarly, using the DeFranco et al. (2011) measure 
in Columns (6) and (7), we find reduced returns both for firms exhibiting low increases in 
comparability (coefficient on IFRS = –0.016, t-stat = –1.64) and high increases in comparability 
                                                                                                                                                             
abnormal return.  Finally, we aggregate all analyst recommendation returns for a given fiscal year, weighting the 
recommendations by the relative magnitude of the upgrade, to derive a firm-level cumulative abnormal return to 
total upgrades.  To weight the recommendation upgrades, we use a scale ranging from 1 (“Strong Buy”) to 5 
(“Strong Sell”).  Thus, an upgrade from 3 (“Hold”) to 2 (“Buy”) receives a weight of one, whereas an upgrade 
from 4 (“Sell”) to 2 (“Buy”) receives a weight of two.  Results are robust to alternative algorithms to aggregate 
the analyst upgrades. 26 
 
(coefficient on IFRS = –0.023, t-stat = –2.13).  However, we again fail to find that firms with 
high increases in comparability have relatively more negative returns (F-value = 0.16).  
Similarly, untabulated results indicate that IFRS adoption is associated with a significant 
decrease in the incidence of analyst recommendation upgrades, although the decrease is not more 
pronounced in firms experiencing a greater increase in comparability.  Overall, the above results 
using analyst purchase recommendations as an alternative proxy for private information are 
consistent with (albeit weaker than) our primary results. 
 
Confounding Effects Related to Time 
  Recall that our primary experimental variable is IFRS, which is an indicator that equals 
one for firms reporting under IFRS.  It is possible that IFRS could be confounded by time-effects 
unrelated to IFRS adoption, raising challenges to the inferences.  To mitigate concerns that 
contemporaneous events could affect our results (e.g., Christensen et al. 2011), we first note that 
results (untabulated) are robust to the following: including year indicator variables in addition to 
our experimental indicator variable of IFRS; including random year indicator variables in 
addition to our experimental indicator variable of IFRS; and including an indicator variable for 
observations post-2005 in addition to our experimental indicator variable of IFRS.  To the extent 
inclusion of these time indicator variables absorbs confounding non-IFRS effects occurring 
within our sample period, this provides additional robustness for our inferences.  Second, we 
exploit the staggered adoption of IFRS among mandatory adopters in the UK that arises from 
differences in fiscal year ends.  This naturally partitions firms into subsets that adopt IFRS at 
different points in calendar time.  We find that the decrease in abnormal returns to insider 
purchases coincides with IFRS adoption.  Finally, we exclude 2005, the first year of IFRS 27 
 
adoption, to eliminate effects that may be attributable to this transition year, such as firms 
providing greater levels of disclosure or higher scrutiny by investors and regulators.  All results 
are robust to excluding this year. 
 
Short-window returns to insider purchases 
  We repeat the primary results using a shorter measurement window to define the 
dependent variable.  The primary analyses use longer windows (e.g., three-month), consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Seyhun 1998; Huddart and Ke 2007).  We now define the dependent 
variable as the market-adjusted returns to insider purchases over the five-day period beginning 
one day after the trade occurs.  Untabulated results are consistent with the primary analyses that 
rely on the longer measurement windows.  Following Table 3, we find that abnormal returns to 
insider purchases decrease following IFRS adoption (coefficient on IFRS = –0.004, t-stat = –
2.87).  We also find some evidence that these returns are reduced more for those firms exhibiting 
the greatest increase in comparability, although this difference is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.  Overall, the results are consistent with the primary findings, although 
weaker in cross-sectional partitions. 
 
UK firms listed on the AIM 
  We now examine UK firms listed on the AIM, which is an exchange for smaller growing 
firms.  Of note, AIM-listed firms are required to adopt IFRS effective fiscal 2007, thus delaying 
IFRS adoption by up to two years relative to UK firms listed on the main exchange.  However, 
since UK standards are similar to IFRS, this leads to an expectation that the benefits of improved 
comparability should accrue even to UK firms not immediately adopting IFRS, as these benefits 28 
 
arise primarily from adoption by non-UK firms (i.e., competitors).  Of course, several 
institutional characteristics of AIM firms can attenuate these expectations: AIM firms tend to 
have weak performance and governance (Gerakos et al. 2011), are more likely to be locally 
focused in their operations, and have an unclear benchmark for evaluating abnormal returns 
(owing to their smaller size and generally higher riskiness).  Consistent with these qualifications, 
results for the AIM firms are sensitive to their chosen risk adjustment.  Using the AIM sample to 
replicate Table 3, we find a negative coefficient on IFRS, though it is significant only for the 
three-month return (–0.033, t-stat = –4.20) and six-month return (–0.064, t-stat = –4.90).  
Turning to the replication of Table 4, we fail to find evidence of relatively reduced abnormal 
returns to insider purchases for firms experiencing greater increases in comparability using the 
DeFond et al. (2011), DeFranco et al. (2001) or Yip and Young (2012) measures.  Overall, the 
results using the AIM firms are consistent, but weaker, as compared to those results using UK 
firms listed on the main exchange.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
  This paper investigates whether mandatory IFRS adoption leads to capital market 
benefits through enhanced financial statement comparability.  To isolate the effects of 
comparability, we use firms domiciled in the UK as our setting.  Prior academic and practitioner 
research suggest that UK domestic standards are similar to those under IFRS.  Thus, any effects 
of changing to IFRS for UK firms are less likely to reflect changes in the precision of reporting 
signals specific to these firms (i.e., “core information quality”), and are more likely to reflect 
changes in comparability (i.e., changes in core information quality for non-UK firms, or across-
firm reporting signals).  We use as the dependent variable abnormal returns to insider purchases 29 
 
of stock, where insiders represent sophisticated users likely to possess private information.  If 
IFRS reduces private information by enhancing the comparability of financial statements, we 
predict that abnormal returns to insider purchases will be reduced following mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the UK.  Empirical results are consistent with these expectations, with abnormal 
returns to insider purchases decreasing following IFRS adoption across short (five-day) and long 
(one-, three-, and six-month) window return settings.   
We further examine alternative partitions of firms to better isolate those most likely 
affected by changes in comparability versus core information quality upon mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  To identify firms that experienced greater increases in comparability, we use three 
alternative measures based on: DeFond et al. (2011); DeFranco et al. (2011); and intra-industry 
information transfers adapted from Yip and Young (2012) and Wang (2011).  We find that the 
reduction in abnormal returns to insider purchases is greater for firms having larger versus 
smaller increases in comparability.  In addition, we use four proxies to identify firms having ex 
ante high quality core information: firms having low change in accruals, low reconciling items 
between UK standards and IFRS, low closely held shares, or high analyst following.  Within 
each group, we continue to find lower abnormal returns to insider purchases subsequent to 
mandatory IFRS adoption, again consistent with improvements to comparability.  
We infer that these results are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption reflecting capital 
market benefits attributable to improved comparability.  These results build on the substantial 
literature investigating the effects of IFRS adoption, particularly that examining comparability 
(e.g., DeFond et al. 2011, and Yip and Young 2012), by documenting that benefits to IFRS 
adoption are not limited to countries exhibiting large differences between domestic standards and 
IFRS, or to firms exhibiting low information quality.  Rather, improvements can also accrue in 30 
 
settings in which information quality is already high, and incumbent domestic standards are 
already similar to IFRS.  These insights are likely of interest to continuing deliberations 
surrounding further IFRS adoption, including within the US and other countries.  We note that 
while the UK provides unique advantages as an empirical setting, it likely also represents a lower 
bound in terms of potential capital market benefits from improved comparability, due to the 
relatively developed features of its reporting and capital markets.  Future research may provide 
evidence of greater capital market benefits in other empirical settings. 
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Figure 1  Performance of UK FTSE 100 Index, 2002–2007  
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Notes:  
This figure presents the weekly UK FTSE index closing values over the period January 1, 2002 
through December 31, 2007.   
 
 
 
Sample Period 35 
 
TABLE 1   
Sample selection 
              
 
Panel A.  Sample selection 
  Unique 
Firms 
Firm  
Years 
All firms listed on UK stock exchanges  2,988  9,832 
    
Less:    firms that did not adopt IFRS by 2006  (1,796)  (5,647) 
            firms without insider purchases  (404)  (1,164) 
            firms lacking necessary financial or market data  (45)  (287) 
            firms without pre- and post-2005 data   (80)  (118) 
Final Sample  663  2,616 
 
 
Panel B.  Comparison of sample firms to all UK firms 
 
Variable 
All UK Firms 
(N = 8,949) 
Sample Firms 
(N = 2,616) 
 
Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median 
Sales   1,068.380  18.705  2,744.870  249.046  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Net Income  47.565  0.487  130.895  8.171  < 0.001  < 0.001 
ROE –1.644  0.012  –0.022  0.029  0.030  <  0.001 
Total Assets   3,952.810  53.620  11,721.460  335.803  < 0.001  < 0.001 
% firms with year-end of             
     December   39.6%    44.7%    < 0.001   
     non-December   60.4%    55.3%    < 0.001   
 
 
Panel C.  Industry composition 
Fama-French 12-Industry Classification  Firms  Firm-Years  % of Sample 
01 – Consumer non-durables  45  179  6.84 
02 – Consumer durables   12  48  1.83 
03 – Manufacturing  50  197  7.53 
04 – Energy   18  70  2.68 
05 – Chemicals and allied products   18  71  2.71 
06 – Business equipment  77  303  11.58 
07 – Telecommunications   14  54  2.06 
08 – Utilities  10  40  1.53 
09 – Wholesale, retail   79  311  11.89 
10 – Healthcare  32  126  4.82 
11 – Finance  152  602  23.01 
12 – Others  156  615  23.51 
Total 663  2,616  100.00 36 
 
              
 
Notes: 
This table presents our sample selection and descriptive data.  Panel A presents the sample 
selection.  We begin with all firms listed on UK stock exchanges.  We then exclude firms that 
did not adopt IFRS by 2006, with no insider purchases per the Directors Deal database, lacking 
necessary financial and market data, and not having data for both the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS 
periods.  Panel B compares the sample firms to all firms listed on UK stock exchanges.  Panel C 
presents the industry composition. 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics 
              
 
Panel A.  Trade level descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean  Std  1Q  Median  3Q 
# insiders purchasing  1.667  1.900  0.000  1.000  2.000 
# insiders selling  1.404  2.245  0.000  0.000  2.000 
£ purchases (000s)  198.835  1,628.353 0.000  19.603  81.743 
£ sales (000s)  1,450.529  10,474.060 0.000  0.000  566.312 
Shares purchased /  
      shares outstanding 
  (written as 100.000%) 
 
0.100 
 
0.800 
 
0.000 
 
0.005 
 
0.051 
Shares sold /  
      shares outstanding 
  (written as 100.000%) 
 
0.340 
 
1.416 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.131 
 
 
Panel B.  Firm level descriptive statistics (N = 2,616) 
Variable  Mean  Std  1Q Median 3Q 
       
Dependent  Variables:       
   BHRET (1 month)  0.016 0.037  –0.001 0.000 0.013 
   BHRET (3 month)  0.030 0.068  –0.004 0.000 0.032 
   BHRET (6 month)  0.051 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.098 
   BHRET_SELL (1 month)  0.001 0.041 0.001 0.000 0.000 
   BHRET_SELL (3 month)  0.000 0.079 0.004 0.000 0.000 
   BHRET_SELL (6 month)  –0.007 0.123  –0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Independent  Variables:       
   BUYSIZE  0.026 0.220 0.005 0.011 0.019 
   BM  1.622 2.589 0.546 1.058 1.877 
   SIZE  16.596  2.080 15.167 16.472 17.935 
   RD  0.304 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 
   CLOSEHELD  25.200 21.457  7.431 21.289 38.694 
   RETLAG  0.136 0.515  –0.137 0.062 0.308 
   VOLATILITY  0.066 0.006 0.063 0.064 0.067 
   IFRS  0.357 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
              
 
Notes: 
This table presents the descriptive statistics.  Panel A presents trade level data.  Panel B presents 
data for firm-level variables used in our analyses; all variables are defined in Table 3.     38 
 
TABLE 3  
Abnormal returns to insider purchases 
                 
Buy-Hold  Return: 1-Month 3-Month 6-Month 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A.  Univariate analysis (dependent variable is BHRET) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Pre-IFRS (N  =  1,681)  0.0208 0.0000 0.0401 0.0000 0.0675 0.0000 
Post-IFRS (N  =  935)  0.0068 0.0000 0.0123 0.0000 0.0209 0.0000 
Difference (p-value)  < 0.001  0.012  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Panel B.  Multivariate analysis (dependent variable is BHRET) 
Intercept (?)  –0.053   
 (–1.79) *  
–0.042   
 (–1.42) 
–0.097   
 (–1.95) * 
–0.074   
 (–1.48) 
–0.190   
 (–2.39) ** 
–0.153   
 (–1.92) * 
BUYSIZEjt (+)  2.426   
 (5.53) ***
2.422   
 (5.52) ***
2.604   
 (3.41) ***
2.594   
 (3.39) *** 
3.848   
 (2.75) ***
3.832   
 (2.74) ***
BMjt (+)  –0.000   
 (–0.44) 
–0.000   
 (–0.62) 
0.001   
 (1.00)  
0.001   
 (0.86) 
0.004   
 (1.67) ** 
0.004   
 (1.60) * 
SIZEjt (–)  –0.002   
 (–1.80) ** 
–0.001   
 (–1.44) * 
–0.003   
 (–1.60) * 
–0.002   
 (–1.21) 
–0.005   
 (–1.77) ** 
–0.003   
 (–1.39) * 
RDjt (+)  0.002   
 (0.44) 
0.002   
 (0.45) 
–0.003   
 (–0.32) 
–0.003   
 (–0.30) 
0.006   
 (0.45) 
0.006   
 (0.47) 
CLOSEHELDjt (+)  0.001   
 (0.04) 
0.001   
 (0.16) 
–0.001   
 (–0.61) 
–0.001   
 (–0.48)  
–0.001   
 (–0.04) 
0.001   
 (0.08) 
RETLAGjt (–)  –0.003   
 (–0.96) 
–0.004   
 (–1.40)  
–0.008   
 (–1.65) ** 
–0.011   
 (–2.20) ** 
–0.012   
 (–1.60) * 
–0.016   
 (–2.20) ** 
VOLATILITYjt (+)  0.723   
 (2.19) ** 
0.525   
 (1.58) *  
1.200   
 (2.13) ** 
0.777   
 (1.37) * 
2.406   
 (2.65) ***
1.728   
 (1.89) ** 
IFRSjt (–)   –0.012     
 (–4.64) ***
 –0.026     
 (–5.98) *** 
 –0.042     
 (–5.67) ***
Fixed  Effects  Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
        
N  2,616 2,616 2,616 2,616 2,616 2,616 
Adjusted-R
2  0.079 0.086 0.054 0.064 0.063 0.074 
               
Notes: 
This table presents abnormal returns to insider purchases.  The sample includes UK firms that adopted 
IFRS in accordance with the 2002 EU directive.  The sample period is 2003–2006; accordingly, the 39 
 
experimental variable is IFRS, an indicator variable equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS, 
and zero otherwise (i.e., for observations reporting under UK domestic standards).  UK firms adopted 
IFRS either 2005 or 2006, depending on the firm’s fiscal year end.  Panel A presents univariate results 
comparing abnormal returns across the pre- versus post-IFRS periods.  Panel B presents multivariate 
results. 
   
Across both panels, the dependent variable is BHRET, the abnormal buy-and-hold returns to insider 
equity purchases.  Returns are calculated for three measurement windows: one-month; three-month; and 
six-month.  To calculate abnormal buy-and-hold returns, we: (1) measure the stock return to each insider 
purchase starting from the day following the insider trade until the end of the indicated window (i.e., one-
month, three-month, or six-month); (2) subtract the stock return to the UK value-weighted index for the 
same window; and (3) aggregate all firm j insider trades for fiscal year t, weighting the trades by the 
relative shares transacted, to derive a firm-year cumulative abnormal return to total insider purchases.   
 
Standards errors are clustered by firm.  Untabulated industry fixed-effects are by 2-digit SIC code.  ***, 
**, and * indicate significance for one-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The independent variables are: 
 
  BUYSIZEjt  the total number of shares purchased by insiders of firm j during year t divided by the 
number of shares outstanding at the end of year t; 
  BMjt firm  j’s book-to-market ratio, measured at the end of fiscal year t-1 preceding the 
insider trades; 40 
 
  SIZEjt  the log of firm j’s market capitalization (in $ thousands) at the end of fiscal year t-1 
preceding the insider trades; 
  RDjt  indicator variable equaling 1 if firm j reports research and development expenses for 
fiscal year t-1 preceding the insider trades, and 0 otherwise; 
  CLOSEHELDjt  the percentage of firm j’s common shares that are closely held at the end of year t-1 
preceding the insider trades; 
  RETLAGjt  the market-adjusted cumulative return for firm j for year t-1 preceding the insider 
trades; 
  VOLATILITYjt  the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of firm j’s daily stock returns 
on the UK value-weighted market returns over year t-1 preceding the insider trades; 
and 
  IFRSjt  an indicator variable equaling 1 if firm j reports under IFRS in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 4  
Abnormal returns to insider purchases: alternative measures of comparability  
               
Panel A.  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean  Median 
 Low 
Increase in 
Comparability 
High 
Increase in 
Comparability 
 
 
Diff 
Low 
Increase in 
Comparability 
High 
Increase in 
Comparability 
 
 
Diff 
DeFond et al. (2011)  1.302  2.431  < 0.01  1.235  2.191  < 0.01
DeFranco et al. (2011)  –0.063  0.136  < 0.01  –0.022  0.100  < 0.01
 
Panel B.  Multivariate analyses 
Comparability 
Measure:  DeFond et al. (2011)  DeFranco et al. (2011)  Yip and Young (2012) 
/ Wang (2011) 
Increase in 
Comparability:  Low  High  Low  High Low High 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept –0.023     
 (–0.27)  
–0.050   
 (–0.55)  
–0.007   
 (–0.12) 
–0.012   
 (–0.12) 
–0.035   
 (–0.66) 
–0.073   
 (–0.64) 
BUYSIZEjt (+)  1.811   
 (2.01) ** 
4.303   
 (1.68) ** 
3.490   
 (3.19) *** 
4.581   
 (2.88) *** 
1.931   
 (2.59) *** 
4.415   
 (2.22) ** 
BMjt (+)  0.197   
 (1.11) 
–0.154   
 (–1.12)  
0.012   
 (0.11) 
0.220   
 (1.14)  
–0.012   
 (–0.12) 
0.280   
 (1.23)  
SIZEjt (–)  –0.002   
 (–0.73)  
–0.005   
 (–1.66) ** 
–0.002   
 (–0.98) 
–0.001   
 (–0.35) 
–0.004   
 (–1.89) ** 
0.002   
 (0.57) 
R&Djt (+)  0.006   
 (0.34)  
0.000   
 (0.02)  
–0.026   
 (–1.63) 
–0.008   
 (–0.49) 
0.002   
 (0.22) 
–0.009   
 (–0.59) 
CLOSEHELDjt (+)  0.000   
 (0.29)  
–0.000   
 (–0.53)  
–0.000   
 (–1.10) 
–0.000   
 (–1.09) 
–0.000   
 (–0.94) 
0.000   
 (0.41) 
RETLAGjt (–)  –0.004   
 (–0.63)  
–0.017   
 (–1.69) ** 
–0.012   
 (–1.06) 
–0.015   
 (–2.05) ** 
–0.008   
 (–1.33) 
–0.019   
 (–2.10) ** 
VOLATILITYjt (+)  –0.216   
 (–0.24)  
1.345   
 (1.43)  
1.202   
 (2.12) ** 
–0.054   
 (–0.05) 
0.513   
 (0.81)  
1.123   
 (1.02) 
IFRSjt (–)  –0.014   
 (–1.85) ** 
–0.032   
 (–4.10) *** 
–0.016   
 (–2.23) ** 
–0.045   
 (–5.08) *** 
–0.018   
 (–3.75) *** 
–0.063   
 (–5.57) *** 
Fixed Effects  Industry  Industry  Industry Industry  Industry  Industry 
F-test  of  coefficients:          
  IFRSLOW > IFRSHIGH  2.96 *  5.18 **  13.75 *** 
N  868  878 832 832 2,103 513 
Adjusted-R
2  0.062  0.082 0.128 0.108  0.058  0.110 
               
Notes: 42 
 
This table presents abnormal returns to insider purchases for two groups of firms: those experiencing low 
versus high increases in comparability.  The sample includes UK firms that adopted IFRS in accordance 
with the 2005 EU directive.  The sample period is 2003–2006; the experimental variable is IFRS, an 
indicator variable equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS, and zero otherwise (i.e., for 
observations reporting under UK domestic standards).  UK firms adopted IFRS either 2005 or 2006, 
depending on the firm’s fiscal year end.   
 
To operationalize comparability, we use three measures.  First, in columns (1) and (2), we use the ratio 
proposed in DeFond et al. (2011).  This represents the increase in the pool of peer firms using the same 
set of standards, calculated for each 2-digit SIC industry group in our sample.  The numerator is the 
number of UK firms plus the number of firms in other E.U. countries, which report under IFRS by 2006.  
The denominator is the number of UK firms reporting under UK domestic standards in 2003 and 2004.  
We designate firms as experiencing a low (high) increase in comparability if their industry is in the 
bottom (top) tercile of the percentage increase in comparable peers.   
 
Second, in columns (3) and (4), we use the method proposed by DeFranco et al. (2011) and adapted by 
Lang et al. (2010) and Yip and Young (2012) for cross-country analysis.  We estimate a firm-year 
specific accounting function based on a regression of earnings on stock returns (see Equation (2)).  We 
then compute a firm’s expected earnings using its own accounting function and that of its non-UK 2-digit 
SIC industry peers (see Equations (3) and (4)).  The average difference between a firm’s expected 
earnings using its own accounting function and that of its peers multiplied by minus one constitutes the 
firm-year specific accounting comparability (ACOMP) measure (see Equation (5)).  We designate firms 43 
 
as experiencing a low (high) increase in comparability if their change from pre- to post-IFRS average 
ACOMPit is in the bottom (top) tercile. 
 
Third, in columns (5) and (6), we use an intra-industry information transfer method adapted from Yip and 
Young (2012) and Wang (2011).  For each firm-year in our sample with a non-missing earnings 
announcement date, we compute the absolute value of the equally-weighted mean three-day market-
adjusted return across all the firm’s foreign industry peers within the EU, based on 2-digit SIC industry 
classification, centered around the earnings announcement.  We then regress that absolute return on the 
firm’s change in annual EPS and its interaction with an indicator for fiscal years where financial reports 
are filed under IFRS, and estimate the coefficients separately for each 2-digit SIC group.  We designate 
firms in a given industry as experiencing a high increase in comparability if the industry-level model is 
significant (as per an F test) and the coefficient on the interaction between the change in EPS and IFRS is 
significantly positive (with a one-tailed p-value below 0.10), and all others as experiencing a low increase 
in comparability.  
 
In all regressions, the dependent variable is BHRET, the three-month abnormal buy-and-hold returns to 
insider purchases, calculated in three steps: (1) measure the stock return to each insider purchase over the 
three-month window beginning with the day following the insider trade; (2) subtract the stock return to 
the UK value-weighted index for the same window; and (3) aggregate all firm j insider trades for fiscal 
year t, weighting the trades by the relative shares transacted, to derive a firm-year cumulative abnormal 
return to total insider purchases.  All other variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Standards errors are clustered by firm.  Untabulated industry fixed-effects are by 2-digit SIC code.  ***, 
**, and * indicate significance for one-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 45 
 
TABLE 5  
Abnormal returns to insider purchases: firm partitions 
                   
Panel A.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median 
 Low 
Information 
Quality 
High 
Information 
Quality 
 
 
Diff 
Low 
Information 
Quality 
High 
Information 
Quality 
 
 
Diff 
Changes in Accruals  0.070  –0.068  < 0.01 0.038  –0.036  < 0.01
Reconciling Items  0.163  0.011  <0.01 0.089  0.009  <0.01
Closely Held Shares  47.432  5.605  < 0.01 46.924  1.230  < 0.01
Analyst Following  0.162  2.364  < 0.01 0.000  2.398  < 0.01
 46 
 
 
Panel B.  Multivariate analyses 
Partition:  Change in Accruals  Reconciling Items  Closely Held Shares  Analyst Following 
Core Information Quality:  LOW  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  LOW  HIGH 
Proxy: 
 
High 
Accruals 
 
Low 
Accruals 
High 
Reconciling 
Items 
Low 
Reconciling 
Items 
High 
Closely  
Held Shares 
Low  
Closely  
Held Shares 
Low  
Analyst 
Following 
High  
Analyst 
Following 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8) 
Intercept –0.131     
 (–1.70) * 
0.032   
 (0.29)  
–0.096   
 (–0.71)  
0.039   
 (0.43)  
0.062   
 (0.64) 
0.014   
 (0.14) 
–0.056   
 (–0.87) 
–0.079   
 (–0.67) 
BUYSIZEjt (+)  4.328   
 (3.08) *** 
1.695   
 (1.58) * 
1.002   
 (0.83)  
2.720   
 (1.91) ** 
2.159   
 (2.51) *** 
1.029   
 (0.57) 
2.649   
 (2.31) ** 
1.629   
 (0.76) 
BMjt (+)  0.187   
 (0.69)  
0.145   
 (0.55) 
0.001  
 (0.51)  
0.001   
 (0.63) 
0.127   
 (0.70) 
–0.157   
 (–1.34) 
0.036   
 (0.39) 
0.251   
 (0.61) 
SIZEjt (–)  –0.001   
 (–0.24) 
–0.003   
 (–0.92)  
–0.005   
 (–1.50) * 
–0.002   
 (–0.76)  
–0.001   
 (–0.45) 
–0.003   
 (–1.28) 
0.003   
 (1.13) 
–0.005   
 (–1.56) * 
R&Djt (+)  –0.008   
 (–0.36) 
0.011   
 (0.75) 
–0.009   
 (–0.73)  
–0.012   
 (–0.84)  
–0.021   
 (–1.49) * 
0.005   
 (0.31) 
–0.002   
 (–0.15) 
–0.016   
 (–1.26) 
CLOSEHELDjt (+)  –0.000   
 (–0.64) 
–0.000   
 (–0.40) 
–0.000   
 (–0.37)  
–0.000   
 (–0.49)  
–0.000   
 (–0.27) 
0.000   
 (0.73) 
–0.000   
 (–0.07) 
–0.000   
 (–0.98) 
RETLAGjt (–)  –0.014   
 (–1.49) * 
–0.023   
 (–2.61) ***
0.004   
 (0.43)  
–0.027   
 (–3.00) *** 
–0.007   
 (–0.77) 
–0.019   
 (–1.99) ** 
–0.002   
 (–0.20) 
–0.021   
 (–2.22) ** 
VOLATILITYjt (+)  1.455   
 (1.77) ** 
0.549   
 (0.55) 
3.001   
 (1.74) ** 
0.989   
 (0.99)  
–0.586   
 (–0.74) 
1.412   
 (1.06) 
0.224   
 (0.34) 
3.274   
 (2.38) ***
IFRSjt (–)  –0.028   
 (–3.59) *** 
–0.034   
 (–3.52) ***
–0.014   
 (–2.10) ** 
–0.041   
 (–4.92) *** 
–0.034   
 (–4.05) *** 
–0.014   
 (–1.87) ** 
–0.019   
 (–2.84) ***
–0.016   
 (–2.15) ** 
Fixed  Effects  Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry  Industry  Industry 
N  855 852 927 923  870  874  1,055  871 
Adjusted-R
2  0.125 0.094 0.105 0.133  0.090  0.091 0.102  0.098 
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Notes:  
This table presents abnormal returns to insider purchases across firms partitioned by low versus high information quality.  We use four 
partitions to capture information quality: change in accruals (where accruals are defined as the absolute difference between cash flows 
from operations and net income, scaled by total assets) in columns (1) and (2); reconciling items between UK standards and IFRS 
(scaled by market capitalization) in columns (3) and (4); (percent) closely held shares in columns (5) and (6); and analyst following in 
columns (7) and (8).  We designate as low information quality those firms having top tercile of change in accruals, above median 
reconciling items, top tercile closely held shares, or bottom tercile analyst following.  We designate as high information quality those 
firms having bottom tercile of change in accruals, below median reconciling items, bottom tercile closely held shares, or top tercile 
analyst following.  Accordingly, columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) represent samples having low information quality; columns (2), (4), (6), 
and (8) represent samples having high information quality; that latter columns are of primary interest. 
 
Across all columns, the sample includes UK firms that adopted IFRS in accordance with the 2002 EU directive.  The sample period is 
2003–2006; the experimental variable is IFRS, an indicator variable equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS, and zero 
otherwise (i.e., for observations reporting under UK domestic standards).  UK firms adopted IFRS either 2005 or 2006, depending on 
the firm’s fiscal year end.    
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The dependent variable is BHRET, the three-month abnormal buy-and-hold returns to insider equity purchases, calculated in three 
steps: (1) measure the stock return to each insider purchase over the three-month window beginning with the day following the insider 
trade; (2) subtract the stock return to the UK value-weighted index for the same window; and (3) aggregate all firm j insider trades for 
fiscal year t, weighting the trades by the relative shares transacted, to derive a firm-year cumulative abnormal return to total insider 
purchases.  All other variables are defined in Table 3.  
 
Standards errors are clustered by firm.  Untabulated industry fixed-effects are by 2-digit SIC code.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance for one-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6  
Abnormal returns to analyst recommendation upgrades 
                   
  Base Regression (Replication of Table 3)  Comparability Measures (Replication of Table 4) 
    DeFond et al. (2011)  DeFranco et al. (2011) 
  
1-Month 
 
3-Month 
 
6-Month 
Low  
Increase in 
Comparability 
High 
Increase in 
Comparability 
Low  
Increase in 
Comparability 
High 
Increase in 
Comparability
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) 
Intercept –0.025     
 (–0.69) 
–0.141   
 (–1.70) * 
–0.402   
 (–2.78) ** 
–0.085   
 (–0.85)  
–0.032   
 (–0.21)  
0.169   
 (1.15) 
–0.033   
 (–0.25) 
BMjt (+)  0.001   
 (0.74)  
0.005  
 (1.65) * 
0.014   
 (2.46) *** 
1.367    
 (1.83) ** 
1.648   
 (2.30) *** 
0.255   
 (1.13)  
0.975   
 (1.32) 
SIZEjt (–)  –0.001   
 (–0.19) 
–0.003   
 (–1.54) * 
–0.002   
 (–0.60) 
–0.006   
 (–1.26)  
0.002   
 (0.55)  
–0.003   
 (–0.27) 
–0.007   
 (–1.32)  
R&Djt (+)  –0.010   
 (–1.79) 
–0.013   
 (–1.05) 
–0.011   
 (–0.59) 
–0.055   
 (–1.96)  
0.012   
 (0.80)  
–0.020   
 (–0.81) 
–0.005   
 (–0.25) 
CLOSEHELDjt (+)  0.000   
 (0.49) 
–0.001   
 (–0.35) 
0.001   
 (0.89) 
–0.001   
 (–1.78)   
0.001   
 (1.74) ** 
–0.000   
 (–1.07) 
–0.000   
 (–0.69) 
RETLAGjt (–)  –0.009   
 (–2.23) ** 
–0.019   
 (–2.42) *** 
–0.041   
 (–2.69) *** 
–0.011   
 (–0.71)  
–0.029   
 (–2.45) *** 
–0.018   
 (–1.05) 
–0.019   
 (–1.62) * 
VOLATILITYjt (+)  0.500   
 (1.11) 
0.721   
 (0.68) 
4.364   
 (2.32) ** 
1.457   
 (1.21)  
–0.089   
 (–0.05) 
–2.448   
 (–1.29) 
–0.095   
 (–0.05) 
IFRSjt (–)  –0.007   
 (–2.41) *** 
–0.020   
 (–3.48) *** 
–0.029   
 (–2.83) *** 
–0.010   
 (–0.91)  
–0.025   
 (–2.68) *** 
–0.016   
 (–1.64) * 
–0.023   
 (–2.13) ** 
Fixed  Effects  Industry Industry Industry Industry  Industry  Industry Industry 
F-test of coefficients:               
  IFRSLOW > IFRSHIGH   n/a    n/a  n/a  1.02  0.16 
N  1,757 1,757 1,757  483  650  488  592 
Adjusted-R
2  0.047 0.054 0.073 0.098  0.076  0.155 0.091 
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Notes:  
This table presents abnormal returns to analyst recommendation upgrades.  The sample includes UK firms that adopted IFRS in 
accordance with the 2002 EU directive.  The sample period is 2003–2006; the experimental variable is IFRS, an indicator variable 
equal to one for observations reporting under IFRS, and zero otherwise (i.e., for observations reporting under UK domestic standards).  
UK firms adopted IFRS either 2005 or 2006, depending on the firm’s fiscal year end.   
 
We replicate the findings of Table 3 using Columns (1), (2), and (3) examine the abnormal returns to analyst recommendation 
upgrades over one-month, three-month, and six-month measurement windows, respectively.  We replicate the findings of Table 4 
using Columns (4) and (5) to partition firms based on the comparability proxy developed by DeFond et al. (2011), and Columns (6) 
and (7) to partition firms based on the comparability proxy developed by DeFranco et al. (2011).   
 
Across all columns, the dependent variable is BHRET_ARU, abnormal buy-and-hold returns to analyst recommendation upgrades.  We 
define as upgrades those recommendations that either: (i) are both more favorable than the previously issued recommendation, and 
have at least a “Hold” recommendation; or (ii) first-time recommendations that are designated as a “Buy” or “Strong Buy.”  We 
calculate abnormal buy-and-hold returns using three steps: (1) measure the one-month, three-month, or six-month stock return to each 
analyst recommendation upgrade starting from the day following the recommendation’s disclosure; (2) subtract the stock return to the 51 
 
UK value-weighted index for the same window; and (3) aggregate all recommendation upgrades across analysts for firm j for year t to 
derive a firm-year cumulative abnormal return to analyst recommendation upgrades.   
 
Standards errors are clustered by firm.  Untabulated industry fixed-effects are by 2-digit SIC code.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance for one-tailed tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  All other variables are defined in Table 3. 
 